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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 
The individuals who have agreed to 
participate in this brief are 29 law professors who 
teach and write about administrative law. They 
have no interest in these cases or the parties except 
in their capacities as teachers and scholars.  Their 
names and affiliations appear in an Addendum to 
this brief.  They are filing this brief in support of 
neither party in order to call the Court’s attention 
to pragmatic considerations of which the Court 
should be aware in deciding the question 
presented. Some of the amici believe that 
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) are inferior 
officers, while others believe that they are properly 
treated as employees.  All of us agree that, 
whatever the Court’s conclusion, the result must 
continue to protect the independence of ALJs, 
consistent with the goal of the Administrative 
Procedure Act which created their positions. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
After presiding at a hearing, an ALJ 
employed by the Securities & Exchange 
Commission (SEC) wrote an Initial Decision in 
which he determined that petitioners Raymond J. 
Lucia et al. (Lucia) violated statutes implemented 
by the SEC. Lucia exercised its right pursuant to 
                                                          
1 This brief is filed pursuant to consents obtained from all 
parties. No person other than amici and their counsel have 
authored this brief in whole or in part or made a monetary 
contribution toward its preparation or submission. 
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SEC rules to obtain de novo review of that decision. 
17 C.F.R. § 201.410, 201.411. The SEC conducted 
“an independent review of the record, except with 
respect to those findings not challenged on review.” 
Pet. App. 40a. The SEC exercised the power 
conferred on it by the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA): “On appeal from or review of the initial 
decision, the agency has all the powers it would 
have in making the initial decision.” 5 U.S.C. § 
557(b). In its opinion, the SEC agreed with the ALJ 
with respect to most but not all issues. Two 
Commissioners dissented with respect to one issue.  
Lucia sought review of the SEC decision in 
the D.C. Circuit. Lucia argued, inter alia, that the 
SEC’s decision was invalid because the ALJ who 
presided in the hearing was an inferior officer who 
was not appointed in a manner consistent with the 
Appointments Clause. Instead, the SEC had 
appointed the ALJ in a manner consistent with the 
APA. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 provides that “each agency” 
that employs ALJs “shall appoint” the ALJs who 
work for the agency. 5 U.S.C. § 5372 provides that 
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) “shall 
by regulation prescribe .  .  .  the qualifications to 
be required for appointment [of ALJs].” Acting 
under authority delegated by the SEC, the Chief 
ALJ at the SEC appointed the ALJ who presided in 
this case. That ALJ had previously been 
determined by OPM to be qualified to be an ALJ.       
A panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
upheld the SEC decision on the basis of its 
conclusion that SEC ALJs are employees rather 
than inferior officers because their decisions at the 
conclusion of a hearing are only recommendations 
that the SEC is free to accept or reject. Raymond J. 
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Lucia Cos. v. SEC, 832 F.3d 277 (D.C. Cir. 2016), 
rehearing en banc denied, 868 F.3d 1021 (2017).  
Before the Court granted the writ of 
certiorari in this case, the Solicitor General filed a 
brief in which he announced that the government 
had changed its position and now believes that 
ALJs are inferior officers who can only be 
appointed by Heads of Departments. The 
government expressed its agreement with the 
opinion of the Tenth Circuit in Bandimere v. SEC, 
844 F.3d 1168, rehearing en banc denied, 855 F.3d 
1128 (10th Cir. 2016). The Tenth Circuit held that 
SEC ALJs are inferior officers even though they 
lack the power to make final decisions because 
their positions, including their “duties, salary, and 
means of appointment,” are established by statute 
and because they exercise significant discretion in 
carrying out important quasi-judicial functions.        
The SEC responded to this change in the 
government’s position the next day by issuing an 
order in which it ratified the appointments of ALJs 
that had previously been made by its Chief ALJ 
and ordered its ALJs to reconsider the actions they 
had taken in pending proceedings in their new 
capacity as appointees of the head of the agency. 
Order, In re: Pending Administrative Proceedings 
(Nov. 30, 2017).  
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 
The history of ALJs—and in particular, the 
importance of their independence within agencies, 
sheds important light on this case. Amici 
respectfully urge this Court to evaluate this case in 
light of the congressional purpose of ensuring the 
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independence and neutrality of ALJs. These 
features, in turn, protect the property and liberty 
interests at stake in agency adjudications and, 
ultimately, act as checks on agency power. 
Congress devoted a substantial amount of 
time during the 1930s and 1940s to the question of 
how to structure agencies that engage in 
adjudication of regulatory disputes. That debate 
resulted in unanimous enactment of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946. One 
of the core features of the APA was a complicated 
set of statutory safeguards to assure that the 
hearing examiners (later renamed ALJs) who were 
to preside over most agency hearings did not act in 
ways that reflected bias in favor of the agency that 
employed them. Congress created a multi-step 
process for appointing hearing examiners and 
imposed statutory limits on the power of agencies 
to manage and remove hearing examiners that 
were specifically designed to ensure that they had 
an appropriate degree of decisional independence 
from the agencies whose cases they were to hear. 
This Court issued three opinions during the 
period from 1950 to 1955 in which it (1) 
acknowledged with obvious approval the 
congressional decision to create the position of 
hearing examiner with a degree of decisional 
independence from the agencies whose cases they 
adjudicate, (2) encouraged Congress to use 
independent hearing examiners to preside in all 
agency hearings, and (3) upheld the initial rules 
the Civil Service Commission (later renamed the 
Office of Personnel Management) issued to 
implement the provisions of the APA that were 
intended to assure that hearing examiners have an 
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appropriate degree of decisional independence 
from the agencies at which they preside. 
This case was initiated in response to the 
SEC’s use of the discretion Congress conferred on 
it in the Dodd-Frank Act to use its ALJs to preside 
in hearings in some types of enforcement 
proceedings.  Previously, such cases were subject to 
adjudication exclusively in federal district courts. 
The shift of some enforcement cases from federal 
courts to the SEC gave rise to complaints that SEC 
ALJs were unduly biased in favor of the SEC. 
Ironically, to the extent that pro-agency bias is a 
concern, changing the status of ALJs as urged by 
petitioner would give the agency greater control 
over ALJ—precisely the outcome that Lucia 
purports to disavow.   
The Court’s holding and approach in this 
case have major implications for the adjudicative 
structure of the federal government. If the Court 
were to apply the Tenth Circuit test to the five SEC 
ALJs as the basis for a holding that they are 
inferior officers, federal courts would be required to 
apply the same test to the 1,926 ALJs who perform 
analogous functions at other agencies. And it would 
almost certainly trigger similar challenges to 
decisions made by the thousands of non-ALJ 
adjudicators (often referred to as administrative 
judges or AJs) who perform analogous functions at 
other agencies. Together, ALJs and AJs preside at 
hearings in millions of adjudications each year.   
If, as seems likely, that iterative process 
yielded a series of holdings that many thousand 
federal employees with responsibilities that 
include presiding at hearings are inferior officers, 
federal courts would then have to decide what to do 
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about the cases that have been the subject of 
hearings presided over by those unconstitutionally 
appointed officers. Courts would also have to 
decide whether the statutory restrictions on 
removal of the members of this large new class of 
inferior officers are constitutional, an issue not 
before the Court in this case. The point, however, 
is that the stakes are sufficiently high to justify a 
judicial approach that preserves as much as 
possible the congressional design to check agency 
power through the use of ALJs.  
    
ARGUMENT 
 
I. THE METHOD OF APPOINTING ALJs AND 
THE STATUTORY LIMITS ON MANAGEMENT 
AND REMOVAL OF ALJs HAS A RICH 
HISTORY. 
 
A. CONGRESS DEVOTED MUCH OF THE 1930s 
AND 1940s TO DESIGNING A STRUCTURE IN 
WHICH ALJs HAVE AN APPROPRIATE 
DEGREE OF DECISIONAL INDEPENDENCE. 
 
During the 1930s and 1940s, Congress 
devoted a great deal of time and effort to crafting 
legislation to govern actions taken by federal 
agencies. After fifteen years of debates and studies, 
Congress unanimously enacted the Administrative 
Procedure Act of 1946 (APA). See George Shepherd, 
Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure 
Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 N.W. U. L. 
Rev. 1557 (1996).     
One of the core issues that Congress 
resolved when it enacted the APA was the status of 
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the hearing examiners who were authorized to 
preside over oral evidentiary hearings in 
adjudications in the common situation in which the 
head of an agency did not personally preside. That 
issue was challenging because Congress sought to 
accomplish two potentially competing goals.  
Members of Congress had received many 
complaints that the hearing examiners who 
presided in agency hearings prior to enactment of 
the APA were biased in favor of the agency and 
against the private parties who participated in 
those hearings. See Ramspeck v. Federal Trial 
Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 131-132 
(1953). Congress responded to that concern by 
conferring on the new hearing examiners who 
would preside after enactment of the APA some 
degree of independence from the agencies for which 
they worked. Id. at 132-134.  
Congress also wanted to further the 
potentially conflicting goal of ensuring that the 
agencies themselves would retain control of policy 
decisions in implementing their statutory 
directions. Congress recognized that hearing 
examiners who were sufficiently independent of 
the agency that employed them to reduce concerns 
of bias had the potential to usurp some of the 
policymaking power Congress had conferred on 
their agencies. Congress responded by including in 
the APA provisions that ensure that agencies 
retain the ability to make all of the policy decisions 
that might be raised in an adjudication in which a 
hearing examiner presides. See Paul Verkuil et al., 
The Federal Administrative Judiciary, Admin. 
Conf. of the United States, Recommendations and 
Reports, Vol. II, 770, 801-802 (1992).  
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During its fifteen years of deliberation about 
what became the APA, Congress considered many 
potential ways of reconciling the tension between 
those two potentially conflicting goals. Congress 
eventually settled on a combination of statutory 
provisions that are designed to further both goals 
simultaneously. The APA includes provisions that 
are designed to confer a degree of independence on 
hearing examiners by regulating the agency 
processes of hiring, managing, and removing 
hearing examiners. But it also includes a provision 
that ensures that agencies retain complete control 
of the policy implications of adjudicatory hearings 
by conferring on the agency the authority to 
substitute the agency’s decision for the initial 
decision of the hearing examiner. Except for some 
changes in terminology and compensation, 
Congress has not made material changes in those 
provisions since Congress enacted them in 1946. 
In the APA, Congress gave agencies the 
power to appoint hearing examiners, 5 U.S.C. § 
3105, but it coupled that power with the power of 
the Civil Service Commission (the “Commission”) 
to determine who is qualified to be a hearing 
examiner, 5 U.S.C. § 5372. The Commission 
implemented a merit-based system for determining 
eligibility to be a hearing examiner, and the 
agencies appointed hearing examiners from the list 
of applicants that the Commission determined to 
be eligible. As a result, although ALJs usually work 
for a single agency, they become eligible to be ALJs 
through a process overseen by the Commission. 
In 1972, the Commission changed the name 
of hearing examiners to administrative law judges 
(ALJs). Change of Title to Administrative Law 
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Judge, 37 Fed. Reg. 16,787 (Aug. 19, 1972).  In 
1978, Congress ratified that decision by statute 
and renamed the Civil Service Commission the 
Office of Personnel Management (OPM). Pub. L. 
No. 95-251, 92 Stat. 183 (1978). (In the remainder 
of this brief we will use the terms hearing examiner 
and ALJ interchangeably.) 
 The vast majority of ALJs, 1,655 out of 
1,926, work for the Social Security Administration 
(SSA). Because of frequent significant increases in 
its caseload, SSA often needs to hire large numbers 
of new ALJs. When SSA needs to hire more ALJs 
than the number of applicants that OPM has 
determined to be qualified to be ALJs, SSA asks 
OPM to reopen the process of determining who is 
eligible to be an ALJ. OPM responds to SSA’s need 
by reopening the eligibility determination process. 
Through that process, OPM creates a new list of 
applicants eligible to be ALJs that is long enough 
to allow SSA to hire the number of new ALJs it 
needs to adjudicate the constantly increasing 
number of contested cases in which someone claims 
to be entitled to social security disability benefits. 
Agencies like the SEC routinely hire ALJs who 
have previously worked for SSA. Thus, the initial 
appointment of an ALJ is usually made by SSA 
from the list of eligible applicants created by OPM. 
Other agencies then choose ALJs from the large 
population of ALJs who work for SSA. 
Congress also limited agency power to 
manage hearing examiners in several ways that 
are designed to confer a degree of independence on 
them, thereby protecting the rights of the regulated 
entities involved in adjudications. Congress’s goal 
was to reduce the risk of pro-agency bias in the 
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process of presiding in a hearing, checking 
agencies’ power by precluding them from using 
managerial tools as means of inducing hearing 
examiners to conduct adjudicatory hearings in 
ways that favor the agency and disfavor the private 
parties who participate in the hearings. Thus, the 
employing agency cannot discipline a hearing 
examiner, 5 U.S.C. § 7521; cannot determine the 
compensation of a hearing examiner, 5 U.S.C. § 
5372; cannot assign a case to a hearing examiner 
except in rotation, 5 U.S.C. § 3105; cannot assign a 
hearing examiner any duties that are inconsistent 
with the duties and responsibilities of a hearing 
examiner, 5 U.S.C. § 3105; and cannot subject a 
hearing examiner to supervision or direction by 
any agency employee who engages in “the 
performance of investigative or prosecuting 
functions for an agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2). 
Finally, a disciplinary action can be taken 
against an ALJ “only for good cause established 
and determined by the Merit Systems Protection 
Board (MSPB) on the record after opportunity for 
hearing before the Board.” 5 U.S.C. § 7521.  Thus, 
although the SEC can initiate a proceeding against 
an ALJ, only the independent MSPB can impose 
any form of discipline against him or her. 
At the same time that Congress protected 
the integrity of the hearing process by conferring a 
degree of independence on hearing examiners, 
Congress ensured that agencies retained complete 
control over the legal basis and policy content of 
any decision in an adjudication. Congress 
accomplished that goal by providing that a hearing 
examiner can make only an initial decision and 
that the agency has complete discretion to replace 
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it: “On appeal from or review of the initial decision, 
the agency has all the powers which it would have 
in making the initial decision.” 5 U.S.C. § 557(b). 
This Court has reinforced that congressional 
decision by holding that the initial decision 
qualifies only as part of the record on which the 
court must base its review. Universal Camera v. 
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 493-497 (1951).  
 
B. THIS COURT ISSUED A SERIES OF 
DECISIONS IN THE 1950S IN WHICH IT 
ENDORSED THE LEGAL REGIME 
GOVERNING ALJS THAT CONGRESS 
CREATED. 
 
Shortly after Congress enacted the APA, this 
Court issued a series of decisions regarding the 
qualified independence of hearing examiners in 
which it praised the APA and urged Congress to 
use it as a model for all agency decision-making. In 
Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 
345 U.S. 128 (1953), the Court upheld the initial 
rules issued by the Civil Service Commission to 
govern the compensation and tenure of hearing 
examiners, and the rules governing assignment of 
cases to hearing examiners, over an objection by an 
association of hearing examiners that the rules 
were not adequately protective of the independent 
status of hearing examiners that the APA was 
enacted to protect.  
The six-Justice majority described the 
reasons Congress conferred qualified independence 
on hearing examiners in the APA: “Many 
complaints were voiced against the actions of 
hearing examiners, it being charged that they were 
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mere tools of the agency concerned and subservient 
to the agency heads in making their proposed 
findings of fact and recommendations.” Id. at 131. 
The majority described studies that supported the 
complaints of bias and that urged Congress to 
make hearing examiners “partially independent of 
the agency by which they were employed.” Id. at 
131. The majority then described the congressional 
deliberations about the best ways of accomplishing 
that agreed-upon goal, and described with 
apparent approval the treatment of hearing 
examiners in the APA: “Several proposals were 
considered, and in the final bill Congress provided 
that hearing examiners should be given 
independence and tenure in the existing Civil 
Service system.” Id. at 131-32.    
The majority’s description of the APA’s 
treatment of hearing examiners and its 
characterization of the status of hearing examiners 
left no doubt that the majority understood and 
approved of the congressional decision to confer 
qualified independence on hearing examiners:  
 
Congress intended to make hearing 
examiners ‘a special class of semi-
independent subordinate hearing officers’ by 
vesting control of their compensation, 
promotion and tenure in the Civil Service 
Commission to a much greater extent than 
in the case of other federal employees.  
 
Id. at 132. The majority upheld the Civil Service 
rules based on its conclusion that the rules were 
consistent with congressional intent: 
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The position of hearing examiner is not a 
constitutionally protected position. It is a 
creature of congressional enactment. The 
respondents have no vested right to 
positions as examiners. They hold their 
posts by such tenure as Congress sees fit to 
give them. Their positions may be regulated 
completely by Congress, or Congress may 
delegate the exercise of its regulatory power, 
under proper standards, to the Civil Service 
Commission, which it has done in his case.  
 
Id. at 133.  
 
The three dissenting Justices also implicitly 
approved of the congressional decision to confer 
qualified independence on hearing examiners. 
However, they would have held the rules invalid 
because of their belief that the rules should have 
gone even further in conferring qualified 
independence on hearing examiners: 
 
The Administrative Procedure Act was 
designed to give trial examiners in the 
various administrative agencies a new 
status of freedom from agency control. 
Henceforth they were to be ‘very nearly the 
equivalent of judges even though operating 
within the Federal system of administrative 
justice.’ Agencies were stripped of power to 
remove examiners working with them. 
Henceforth removal could be effected only 
after hearings by the Civil Service 
Commission. That same Commission was 
empowered to prescribe an examiner’s 
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compensation independently of 
recommendations or ratings by the agency in 
which the examiner worked. And to deprive 
regulatory agencies of all power to pick 
particular examiners for particular cases, § 
11 of the Act commanded that examiners be 
‘assigned to cases in rotation so far as 
practicable * * *.’ I agree with the District 
Court and the Court of Appeals that the 
regulations here sustained go a long way 
toward frustrating the purposes of Congress 
to give examiners independence.  
 
Id. at 144 (citation omitted) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 
The Court was even more forceful in its 
approval of, and praise for, the congressional 
decision to confer qualified independence on 
hearing examiners in Wong Yang Sung v. 
McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950). The question before 
the Court was whether the APA provisions 
applicable to hearing examiners applied to 
deportation proceedings. The Court held that they 
did even though no statute explicitly made the APA 
applicable to those hearings.  
 
The Court began by describing the 
widespread complaints of bias that led to the 
enactment of the APA and to its treatment of 
hearing examiners as independent of the agencies 
at which they preside. It also cited to the many 
studies that had substantiated those complaints 
and that had urged statutory changes to reduce the 
pro-agency bias. It then described the years of 
study and deliberation that led to enactment of the 
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APA by unanimous votes in both Houses of 
Congress. Id. at 37-45. The Court summarized the 
process through which the APA was enacted: “The 
Act thus represents a long period of study and 
strife; it settles long-continued and hard-fought 
contentions, and enacts a formula upon which 
opposing social and political forces have come to 
rest.” Id. at 40. 
 
  The Court then compared the unfair and 
biased hearing that the government had provided 
in the case before the Court with the hearing before 
an impartial hearing examiner that the APA 
requires. Id. at 45-47. The Court even suggested 
that the Constitution might compel an agency to 
use the APA hearing procedures: 
 
The constitutional requirement of 
procedural due process of law derives from 
the same source as Congress’ power to 
legislate and, where applicable, permeates 
every valid enactment of that body.  .  .   . 
 
 
We would hardly attribute to Congress a 
purpose to be less scrupulous about the 
fairness of a hearing necessitated by the 
Constitution than one granted by it as a 
matter of expediency. 
  
Indeed, to so construe the Immigration Act 
might again bring it into constitutional 
jeopardy. When the Constitution requires a 
hearing, it requires a fair one, one before a 
tribunal which meets at least currently 
 
 
 
 
 
 16 
 
 
 
prevailing standards of impartiality.  
 
Id. at 49-50. 
 
The Court concluded that the APA 
represented an effort by Congress to set forth the 
“currently prevailing standards of impartiality” 
and thereby to codify the minimum requirements 
of due process. Id. at 50. Based on that conclusion, 
the Court held that the provisions in the APA 
relating to hearing examiners applied to 
deportation proceedings. Id. at 51. In later cases, 
the Court relied on the reasoning in Wong Yang 
Sung as the basis to hold that the APA applies to 
hearings under the Interstate Commerce Act, Riss 
& Co. v. U.S., 341 U.S. 907 (1951), and to Post 
Office fraud hearings, Cates v. Haderlein, 342 U.S. 
804 (1952).  
 
Admittedly, the Court eventually retreated 
from its suggestion that the APA codified due 
process when Congress explicitly rejected that 
interpretation of the Act in the process of enacting 
a deportation statute that authorized hearings that 
fell short of the procedural safeguards reflected in 
the APA. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955). 
But the Court never retreated from its belief that 
the APA adjudication provisions created a model of 
fairness by which all other agency adjudicatory 
procedures should be judged. Indeed, the Court 
upheld the procedures Congress authorized in 
deportation proceedings largely because it believed 
that Congress was “drawing liberally on the 
analogous provisions of the Administrative 
Procedure Act and adapting them to the 
 
 
 
 
 
 17 
 
 
 
deportation process.” Id. at 310. 
 
 
II. ANY CHANGE IN THE STATUS OF ALJS 
SHOULD BE CONSISTENT WITH THE 
OVERRIDING GOAL OF MINIMIZING THE 
RISK OF PRO-AGENCY BIAS. 
 
There are 1,931 ALJs who preside in 
adjudicatory hearings at present. Five are 
employees of the SEC. The other 1,926 preside in 
adjudicatory hearings conducted by 30 other 
agencies.2  If this Court holds that ALJs are 
inferior officers, agencies and courts would then 
have to decide whether to acquiesce in agency-
proposed methods of rehearing those millions of 
adjudicatory disputes, including those by the 
thousands of AJs whose rulings would be subject to 
the same challenge brought here. Even assuming 
some agencies could remedy the Appointments 
Clause deficiency in a manner similar to the SEC’s 
approach, broader considerations related to 
ensuring ALJs’ independence should not be 
overlooked. 
The case before the Court is one of the many 
cases that were triggered by the SEC’s use of the 
discretion Congress conferred on the agency to 
pursue some types of enforcement actions in 
adjudications before ALJs, rather than federal 
district judges. Professor Urska Velikonja has 
provided a detailed description of the manner in 
                                                          
2 See U.S. OPM, ALJs by Agency (Mar. 2017), 
https://www.opm.gov/services-for-agencies/adminstrative-
law-judges/#url=ALJs-by-Agency.  
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which section 929P(a) of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, §929P(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1862 
(2010), enabled the SEC to make greater use of 
ALJs in some types of enforcement cases and led to 
the many cases in which parties who lost in those 
cases sought review based on alleged constitutional 
flaws in the appointment of the ALJs who presided 
in those cases. Urska Velikonja, Are the SEC’s 
Administrative Law Judges Biased? An Empirical 
Investigation, 92 Wash. L. Rev. 315, 317-24 (2017).          
 
In each of those cases, the SEC engaged in 
independent de novo review of the ALJ’s decision 
and concluded that the defendant had violated 
securities laws, and it imposed sanctions on the 
defendant that included civil penalties. In each 
case, the party that was the subject of the sanctions 
sought judicial review of the SEC action and 
argued, inter alia, that the action was invalid 
because the ALJ was an inferior officer who had not 
been appointed in a manner consistent with the 
Appointments Clause.  
 
In some of the cases, the party that was 
subject to the sanctions also argued that the SEC 
action was invalid because the for-cause limit on 
the SEC’s ability to remove an ALJ violates the 
Vesting Clause and the Take Care Clause, as this 
Court interpreted those Clauses in Free Enterprise 
Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010). Velikonja, 92 Wash. L. 
Rev. at 328-30.  The implicit, and in some cases 
explicit, allegation that ALJs are biased against 
the private party underlies the Appointments 
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Clause claims in these cases, but the private 
parties do not explain why they believe there is a 
causal relationship between the method of 
appointment and the presence or absence of a pro-
agency bias.  
 
The claims that SEC ALJs are biased in 
favor of the agency echo the widespread claims of 
bias that provided the impetus for Congress’s 
decision to enact the APA. That statute reduced 
significantly the potential for ALJ bias in the 
process of presiding over agency adjudications. 
Ironically, the claims of bias spawned by the SEC’s 
decision to bring some enforcement actions before 
ALJs, rather than federal district judges, have 
been coupled with the argument that SEC ALJs 
should be appointed by the agencies where they 
preside and should be removable at will by the 
agencies where they preside. 
  
It is hard to imagine a worse fit between an 
alleged problem in decision-making and a proposed 
remedy for that problem. If this Court makes a 
decision that cascades into a legal regime in which 
agencies have greater discretion in the process of 
appointing ALJs and have the discretion to remove 
ALJs without establishing any cause for removal, 
it will have eliminated many of the safeguards 
against pro-agency bias that Congress 
incorporated in the APA and that this Court 
praised as important mechanisms to protect the 
due process rights of the private parties who 
participate in agency hearings. That, of course, 
would increase the risk that SEC ALJs will make 
decisions that reflect pro-agency bias in their roles 
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as presiding officers. 
 
A holding that SEC ALJs are inferior officers 
who must be appointed by heads of departments 
would not necessarily conflict with the 
congressional goal that was the basis for the 
safeguards of ALJ independence that Congress 
incorporated in the APA as long as the initial 
determinations of basic qualifications continued to 
be made by OPM. The APA authorizes agencies to 
appoint ALJs, and this Court has held that the 
SEC qualifies as a “head of department,” as that 
term is used in the Appointments Clause. Free 
Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 512-13. Such a 
holding would be consistent with the critical role 
that Congress assigned the OPM in determining 
the people who have the qualifications required to 
be eligible for appointment by the SEC. Congress 
often limits the scope of the power of appointment 
by qualifying it in various ways, and no court has 
ever held that such a limit violates the 
Appointments Clause.3     
 
But the potential removal ramifications of 
this series of SEC challenges cannot be ignored, 
because they are critical to the broader 
                                                          
3 In FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F. 3d 821, 824-25 
(D.C. Cir. 1993), the D.C. Circuit held that the constitutional 
validity of the common statutory restriction on the 
President’s power to appoint no more than a bare majority of 
the members of a multi-member agency is not justiciable. 
This Court dismissed the petition for writ of certiorari that 
was filed in the case on the basis that the FEC lacks the 
power to represent the United States in the Supreme Court. 
FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 90 (1994).       
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considerations of neutrality underlying the ALJ 
provisions of the APA. Were this Court to hold 
ALJs to be inferior officers without using 
cautiously cabined analysis, a later court would 
likely conclude that the statutory for-cause limit on 
an agency’s power to remove an ALJ violates 
separation of powers. Such a holding would have a 
devastating effect on the decisional independence 
of ALJs. As this Court has recognized, the power to 
remove a government official creates a “here and 
now subservience” between the government official 
and the individual or institution that has the power 
to remove the official. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 
714, 720, 730 (1986). That subservient relationship 
is particularly powerful when the entity that has 
the power to remove the official is not required to 
state a cause for removing the official. If the SEC 
could remove an ALJ without having shown good 
cause for removal, the risk that SEC ALJs would 
behave in a manner that is biased in favor of the 
agency would increase dramatically.   
  
CONCLUSION 
 
          Regardless of the outcome of the 
Appointments Clause issue, the Court should 
resolve the issue in a manner that is respectful of 
the independent relationship between ALJs and 
the agencies that employ them that Congress 
created by passing the APA.   
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